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defendant claimed It was entitled, and thereafter defendant

failed to so advise plaintiff.
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in deny-

ing plaintiff's motion for an order granting it leave to file
an amended complaint to conform to the evidence and to assert a
cause of action for reformation of the typewritten agreement,
where the defendant had previously admitted that the rate
structure alleged by plaintiff was accurate and that there was
no real dispute as to the amount of the debt, if any, but
thereafter nevertheless raised a dispute concerning both the
rate structure and the amount of the debt on the second day of
trial?
4.

Did the trial court err in failing

(a) to find

that a mutual mistake between the parties had occurred because
the rate structure contained in the typewritten agreement did
not accurately embody the intentions of both parties to the
contract and

(b) to reform the contract to accurately reflect

the parties1 true understanding?
5.

Did the trial court err in finding the hand-

written agreement executed by the parties contained a commission rate structure at the rate of .35$ rather than the rate
of 350?
6.

Did the trial court err

in failing to award plain-

tiff its costs of depositions and service of subpoena on defendant's president for his deposition when said depositions were

-2-

taken in good faith and the costs thereof necessarily incurred
for the preparation of plaintiff's case and the subpoena was
reasonably considered by plaintiff to be necessary in light of
defendant's prior failures to cooperate in providing discovery
absent a court order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an action based upon breach of contract for

recovery of commissions due plaintiff Lloyd's Unlimited
("Lloyd's") by defendant Nature's Way Marketing Ltd. ("Nature's
Way") for all product sold by defendant to a third party,
Yurika Foods Corporation ("Yurika"), in consideration of
Lloyd's efforts in inducing Yurika to market the product
handled by Nature's Way. In connection therewith, Lloyd's
sought a formal accounting from Nature's Way with respect to
the products sold to Yurika by Nature's Way by which the amount
of the commission owed to Lloyd's could be ascertained.
Defendant Nature's Way counterclaimed against Lloyd's for the
sum of $7,500.00 arguing that Lloyd's agreed to pay to Nature's
Way one-half of any commissions or payments Lloyd's received
from Yurika.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court.
Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant on
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August 19, 1983.

(R. 2-4A)

Defendant was served on September

17, 1983 with the Summons and Complaint.

(R. 5-7)

Soon after the Complaint was served upon Nature's Way,
plaintiff's counsel was contacted by Bert R. Wonnacott,
Esquire, to discuss the possibility of resolving the matter.
Subsequently, plaintiff's counsel was contacted by Kay M.
Lewis ("Lewis"), to discuss the possibility of settlement.

In

early November, 1983, Lloyd's counsel prepared a First Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and
served the same upon Lewis in an effort to obtain some sort of
reasonable accounting from Nature's Way so that Lloyd's could
adequately discuss and explore the possibility of settlement.
(R. 53-61 and 8~16|)
Despite Lewis' efforts, Nature's Way failed and
refused to submit any answers to the interrogatories or respond
to the request for production of documents and Lloyd's was
forced to file a motion to compel discovery and for appropriate
sanctions with an accompanying memorandum on April 2, 1984.
(R. 17-23)

On April 9, 1984, Lloyd's counsel set the motion to

compel and for sanctions for hearing before the lower court on
April 24, 1984.

(R. 24-25)

Thereafter, Lewis withdrew as

counsel for defendant on April 12, 1984 prior to the date of
the hearing.

(R. 26)

Because of Lewis' withdrawal prior to the hearing,

-4-

plaintiff moved for and obtained an order on April 18, 1984,
directing Nature's Way to appoint new counsel to represent it
in the action prior to the hearing on Lloyd's motion to compel
discovery and for sanctions.

This order was mailed directly to

defendant and its prior counsel,

(R. 27-29)

Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and for
sanctions came for hearing before the trial court as scheduled
on April 24, 1984, and defendant failed to appear.

In connec-

tion with the hearing, the Court entered an order on May 22,
1984, compelling defendant to fully respond to the interrogatories and requests for production on or before June 1, 1984
and awarding Lloyd's the sum of $150.00 as and for attorney's
fees. (R. 35-37)

In addition to its being mailed to defen-

dant's prior counsel, the Order Compelling Discovery and
Awarding Attorney's Fees was personally served upon defendant.
(R. 48-51)
On June 1, 1984, present counsel for Nature's Way
entered an appearance on its behalf.

(R. 38)

In connection with

counsel's appearance for Nature's Way, they sought and obtained
an ex parte order extending the time in which Nature's Way
could respond to discovery to and including June 15, 1984.
45-47)
Nature's Way answered Lloyd's Complaint and
counterclaimed against Lloyd's on October 12, 1984.
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(R.

(R.

71-77).
On January 7, 1985, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment together with an accompanying memorandum
and affidavit seeking partial summary judgment for certain commissions due Lloyd's on sales made by Nature's Way to Yurika
during the period from August 1, 1982 through February 23,
1984.

The amount sought by plaintiff was the sum of

$31,545.64, which sum included interest on the commissions as
of December 1, 1984.

(R. 105-129)

Plaintiff's Motion for Par-

tial Summary Judgment was heard before the lower court on
January 22, 1985.

On that date, the Court found that there was

some ambiguity in the agreement upon which this action is based
and denied the motion,

(R. 142-144)

An order reflecting the

Court's denial of the partial summary judgment was entered by
the Court on January 31, 1985.

(R. 170-172)

Thereafter, the case came on for trial before the
Honorable Dean E. Conder, sitting without a jury, on February
25 and 26, 1985.

After both sides rested, the Court took the

matter under advisement and directed counsel to submit posttrial memoranda.

(R. 177-178)

After the trial hereof and prior to the Court's ruling
thereon, plaintiff moved the Court on March 8, 1985 for an
order allowing it leave to file an amended complaint seeking
reformation of the commission rates schedule contained in the
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issues under advisement and treated the parties1 argument on
the memorandum decision as a motion by the plaintiff to adjust
its March 19, 1985 decision, which motion was denied by the
Court on April 8, 1985.

(R. 307-308)

On May 2, 1985, plaintiff submitted directly to the
Honorable Dean E. Conder, its proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment, Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements, Order Denying Leave to File Amended Complaint
and Order Striking Affidavit of Lynn Burningham.
337-3^0)
Court.

(R. 371-373,

Several of these pleadings were misplaced by the

Nature's Way did not file any objection to the two pro-

posed orders, but objected to Plaintiff's proposed findings and
conclusions and memorandum of costs.

Accordingly, on May 6 and

7, 1985, defendant submitted its own proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the Court, together with its Motion
to Have the Bill of Costs Taxed by the Court.

(R.

317-328)

These two documents were also misplaced by the Court.
Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled and held before the
Honorable Dean E.

Conder on June 11, 1985, for the deter-

mination by the Court of the issues between the parties as to
the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the amount of
costs to be awarded plaintiff.
At the hearing, counsel for plaintiff and defendant
were informed that the Court had misplaced the pleadings
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Nature 1 s Way *s president, Lynn Burn Ingram ("Burningham"

d
• are

both experienced salesmen who spent a substantial portion of
their working lives in the selling
477-478)

profession.

(Tr. 406-408;

Dowdle and Burningham have been acquainted with and

had an ongoing informal personal relationship since the early
1950fs.

(Tr. 408^409; 478-479)
In late 1981 and early 1982, Dowdle and Burningham

were in frequent contact with each other and became generally
aware of the products and sales activity each was then
involved.

(Id.)

During the early part of 1982, Dowdle learned

that Burningham had acquired the rights to market and was
attempting to market a coffee extender product.

(Tr. 409-411)

Shortly after learning of the product, Dowdle became acquainted
with Douglas Webb ("Webb") and learned that he and a number of
other persons who were experienced in the sales field were in
the process of starting a sales organization that would be
involved in the multi-level marketing and sales on a national
basis of various food products.

(Tr. 411, 413-416)

After

meeting Webb and learning of the sales and marketing organization he and his associates were organizing, which company subsequently became Yurika Foods Corporation, Dowdle commenced
discussions with Burningham concerning the possibility of
having Yurika market and sell the coffee extender product.
(Tr. 416-418)
Dowdle informed Burningham of the developing sales
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date, Burningham informed Dowdle that because of the packaging
and production costs, Nature's Way would be unable to pay $1.00
per pound to Lloyd's for the product it sold to Yurika.
425-426)

(Tr.

On that date, the parties executed a handwritten

document prepared by Dowdle (Ex 2; Tr. 424-426, 490-493), which
the District Court found provided the following rate structure
for commissions to be paid by Nature's Way to Lloyd's :
1 unit - 60 packets pack:
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack:
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack:
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack:

.250
.350
500
$1.00

(R. 329-336)
Lloyd's claims that the 2 lb. bulk pack commission
rate on the handwritten agreement is 350 and not .350 and that
the lower court erred in its interpretation of this oortion of
the commission schedule.

(Ex. 2)

Dowdle also testified that he made a mistake in
writing the rate structure in the handwritten agreement and
that the parties intended that the rates to be paid were as
follows:
1
1
1
1

unit
unit
unit
unit

-

60 packets pack:
2 lb. bulk pack:
5 lb. bulk pack:
37 lb. bulk pack:

$ .25
.35
.50
1.00

(Tr. 633-634)
Shortly thereafter, the handwritten agreement was
reproduced in typewritten form.

(Tr. 427-428, 493-494)
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efforts

to contact Nature's Way after that date to discuss the amounts
due Lloyd's, but its efforts were unsuccessful.

These efforts

included several telephone calls, a personal letter, and a
letter from Lloyd's accountant, Spencer Neilsen.

(Exhibits 12,

14, Tr. 431-440, 501-506)
Because Lloyd's failed to receive any further
payment from Nature's Way or any accounting as to sales made,
plaintiff initiated the present action.

Plaintiff alleged in

its Complaint (R. 3), asserted in its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and affidavit and memorandum in support
thereof dated January 4, 1985 (R. 105-129), and claimed at all
times herein and during the trial hereof, that Nature's Way was
obligated to pay Lloyd's commissions based upon the following
rate schedule:
1 unit - 60 packets pack:
1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack:
1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack:
1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack:

$ .25
.35
.50
1.00

Nature's Way denied liability for any commissions, alleging
that there was no consideration for the Agreement between the
parties and that Lloyd's had failed to perform certain obligations not contained within the written agreement.

(R. 71-77,

130-139, 151-169)
Until the second day of the trial, Nature's Way
admitted at all times that the rate structure identified above
advocated by Lloyd's ("Subject Rate Schedule") applied to any
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P. d i n t i f ^ s

v

*tinn

3^, 193s, defendant

states:
Defendant has no objection to what plaintiff
has set out as uncontested facts other than
that important uncontested facts were
omitted.
(R. 130)
The facts which Nature's Way disputes in its response
to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment have nothing
to do with the rate schedule alleged by plaintiff that formed
the basis of the parties' agreement.

(R. 130-132)

The entire

focus of defendant's objection to the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was that the Agreement was unenforceable
because of a failure of consideration.

(R. 130-139; 151-154)

The amount prayed for in Lloyd's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was based upon calculations made by Thomas V.
Chamberlain, C.P.A., based upon the per unit rates contained in
the Subject Rate Schedule.

In connection with its Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, Lloyd's filed an affidavit of
Chamberlain dated December 20, 1984, containing two exhibits
setting forth a summary of computations of commissions due
plaintiff during that period based upon the Subject Rate
Schedule.

At the hearing on said motion on January 22, 1985,

which was attended by Burningham, Nature's Way stipulated that
the amounts computed by Chamberlain based upon the commission
schedule asserted by Lloyd's were true and correct and agreed
that the only determination that the Court needed to make at
-16-
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This order entitled Order Governing Discovery was served upon
counsel for Nature's Way on or about January 29, 1985 and no
objection was filed thereto.

(R. 173-175)

For some unknown reason, the Order Governing Discovery
was never

executed by the Court although the parties complied

with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Order and
Nature's Way failed to advise plaintiff prior to the trial of
any adjustments to which it claims it was entitled.
(R. 145-149 and Appendix "B")
Nature's Way also stipulated at-trial that if the
agreement was enforceable that the amounts alleged by plaintiff
pursuant to the Subject Rate Schedule were accurate.

(Tr. 404,

412-413, 430, 459-461)
On the second day of trial, Nature's Way claimed for
the first time that the commissions should be based specifically upon the typewritten agreement and not upon the Subject
Rate Schedule.

(Tr. 577-579)

Shortly after the trial thereof

and before any ruling the Court, plaintiff sought leave to file
an Amended Complaint to conform to the prior stipulations and
record and evidence at trial and to seek reformation of the
typewritten agreement based upon a scrivener's error and mutual
mistake, which motion was denied by the Court.

(R. 180-181,

218-222, 337-338, 341-342, Appendix "D")
After receiving post-trial memoranda from both par-
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ties, (R. 190-199, 200-217, 230-246, 252-258, 259-264, 268-270)
the lower court ruled that Lloyd's was entitled to a commission
on the products sold by Nature's Way to Yurika, but awarded its
commissions based strictly upon the rate structure set forth in
the typewritten agreement in the total amount of $416.25,
together with costs in the amount of $138.77.

(R. 271,

368-370) Plaintiff sought additional costs from Nature's Way
which were not awarded by the lower court.

(R. 371-373,

325-328, 309-313, Tr. 649-666)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the
Court below, the trial court's findings of fact are not sufficiently supported by the evidence.

In this regard, the trial

court specifically found the intent of the parties did not
change from the dates of execution of the handwritten agreement
and the typewritten agreement, although the terms thereof are
materially different, and there were undisputed evidence and
stipulations prior to and during the trial that both parties
intended that the commissions be paid, if at all, according to
the rate structure alleged by plaintiff.
The defendant should have been estopped from asserting
and the trial court erred in considering and/or admitting evidence that the applicable rate structure was other than that
alleged by plaintiff because the defendant had admitted
-19-

(1) in

its Answer,

(2) in its response to Plaintiff's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment,

(3) at the hearing at the Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment and Pre-Trial Settlement Conference,
and

(4) at the first day of trial, that there was no dispute

concerning the rate structure as alleged by plaintiff.
Additionally, the trial court had previously ordered at the
pre-trial settlement conference that the amounts prayed for by
plaintiff would be deemed accurate unless defendant advised
plaintiff prior to the trial with respect to any offsets or
adjustments to which it was entitled, and the defendant failed
to so advise plaintiff.
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing
plaintiff to file an amended complaint to conform to the evidence and to assert a cause of action for reformation of the
typewritten agreement.

In this regard, the defendant nad pre-

viously admitted on several occasions that the rate structure
alleged by plaintiff was accurate and that there was no real
dispute as to the amount of the debt, if any, but thereafter
nevertheless raised the dispute concerning both the rate structure and the amount of the debt on the second day of trial.
The trial court erred in failing to find that a mutual
mistake between the parties had occurred because the rate
structure contained in the typewritten agreement did not
accurately embody the intentions of both parties to the
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contract and in failing to reform the contract to accurately
reflect the parties' true understanding•
The trial court erred in finding that the handwritten
agreement executed by the parties contained a commission rate
structure at the rate of .350 rather than the rate of 350 as
the review of the handwritten agreement readily discloses.
The trial court erred in failing to award plaintiff
its costs of deposition and service of subpoena on defendant's
president for his deposition when the depositions were taken in
good faith and the costs thereof necessarily incurred in the
preparation of plaintiff's case.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY
AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
AND WITH THE CLEAR WEIGHT

COURT ARE NOT
THE EVIDENCE
THEMSELVES
OF THE EVIDENCE.

Lloyd's recognizes that to mount a successful attack
on the trial court's findings of fact that it must marshall all
of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings even in the light most favorable to the court
below.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Lloyd's submits that even in the view most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial
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court's findings.

The findings of the trial court should be

disturbed in this case because they are clearly against the
weight of the evidence.

See Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247,

332 P.2d 933, 935 (1958).
Paragraphs 3 through 6 of the Findings of Fact entered
by the Court are inaccurate, inconsistent, and clearly against
the weight of the evidence.

Dowdle testified that the original

oral agreement between the parties provided for commissions to
be paid at the rate of $1.00 per pound.

Although Burningham

initially denied this fact (Tr. 481-482), he admitted the
existence of this arrangement on cross-examination.

(R. 593)

This finding is also supported by the handwritten agreement
(Ex. 2) and the fact that Nature's Way paid the sum of $500.00
to Lloyd's for sales to Yurika of the coffee extender product
over the initial approximate three-month period.

This amount

was paid without any formal accounting and at a time in which
sales by Nature's Way to Yurika of the product were just
beginning.

The trial court also found that the parties had

reached an oral understanding prior to execution of the
handwritten agreement.

(Tr. 643)

The clear and convincing weight of the evidence,
however, does not support the Court's findings with respect to
the handwritten agreement.

A review of the commission rate

structure of Exhibit 2, the handwritten agreement, clearly
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indicates that the only unit of sale in which Dowdle placed a
decimal point before the number is .250 for the 60 packets
pack.

The other categories of the commission rate schedule

read 350, 500 and $1.00.
Any reasonable and legal interpretation of the commission schedule and the testimony at the trial hereof is that
both parties agreed upon commissions at the rate of 250, 350,
500 and $1.00, depending upon the rate and size of the quantities sold by Nature's Way to Yurika.

Dowdle testified that

that was the express understanding of the parties and there was
evidence before the Court that he normally wrote 250 as .250,
not recognizing there was any difference.

(R. 296-306)

Burningham testified that he did not specifically remember the
rate structure agreed upon by the parties, but that he felt
bound by the typewritten contract.

(Tr. 584-490)

His testi-

mony at the second day of trial, is completely inconsistent
with every position Nature's Way had taken prior to that date.
As has been previously mentioned, Nature's Way admitted that
the parties' intent was the rate structure alleged by and
testified to by Lloyd's at every other stage of this proceeding, including in its Answer, in its response to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at the hearing
on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in the
deposition of Burningham, and on the first day of trial.
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Moreover, Findings of Fact numbers 4 through 6 are
inherently inconsistent and establish clear grounds for plaintiff's claim for reformation of the commission rate schedule
contained in the typewritten agreement.

This Court has longed

recognized that:
The importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case
tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of
law.
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
This principle was cited in Parks v. Zionys First
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) where the Court
held that the Court's findings must resolve all issues of
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and
judgment and that failure of the Court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be vacated.
By finding that the rate structures in the handwritten
agreement and typewritten agreement were materially different
and subsequently finding that the intent of the parties did not
change between the dates of execution of the two agreements,
the Court found in substance that there had been a mutual
mistake of the parties to the agreement, but refused to allow
the filing of an amended complaint by Lloyd's to reform the
contract to reflect the parties' true understanding.

4 true

and accurate copy of the proposed amended complaint attached as
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an exhibit to Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Leave to
File Amended Complaint, not an initial part of the record
herein, is attached hereto as Appendix ffD.!l
The findings and judgment of the trial court are
clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.

4s previously

stated, the $500.00 check delivered by Nature's Way to Lloyd's
on August 16, 1982, reflected and evidenced the parties'
understanding that the commissions agreed upon were 250, 350,
and 500 per respective unit and not .250, .350, and .500 per
unit.

Furthermore, it is inconceivable and contrary to the

weight of all of the evidence that the parties' agreement was
based upon the express rate schedule of the typewritten
agreement which, if applied, would yield commissions to Lloyd's
in the principal amount of approximately $300.00 on more than
$625,000.00 worth of sales by Nature's Way to Yurika during the
two years subsequent to the date of the typewritten agreement.
The fact that the parties intended their rate commission schedule to be that as alleged by plaintiff is also
clearly shown by the fact that the parties would obviously not
have agreed or intended to pay only a fraction of a cent (.25<2)
on some units and 500 and $1.00 on other per unit sales of the
same product involving only slight differences in weight and
volume.

The only scintilla of evidence supporting a finding

that the parties intended the commission rate structures to be
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a fraction of one penney is the evasive testimony of Burningham
on the trial's second day in which he states he does not
remember the actual rate structure agreed upon but feels bound
by the typed agreement.

All other evidence, including the

deposition testimony of Burningham on September 5, 1984, the
summary judgment hearing, the trial and hearing stipulations,
order of the trial court, and language of the contracts,
clearly support the rate structure as alleged by plaintiff.
Point II
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
AND ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT THE APPLICABLE
RATE STRUCTURE GOVERNING THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT WAS OTHER THAN THAT ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF.
The test of equitable estoppel is set forth in Koch,
Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975):
[Equitable stoppel] is conduct, by act or
omission^by which one party knowingly leads
another party, reasonably acting thereon,
to take some course of action, which will result in his detriment or damage if the first
party is permitted to repudiate or deny his
conduct or representation.
This test was cited with approval in Parks v. Zion's First
National Bank, 590 P.2d at 604.
In the present action, the actions of Nature's Way
satisfy the test of equitable estoppel.

As previously

explained, Nature's Way, on numerous occasions throughout this
proceeding, agreed that if the agreement between the parties
-26-

was enforceable, the commissions should be payable to Lloyd's
according to the Subject Rate Schedule.

This fact was admitted

in defendant's Answer, in its response to Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, at the hearing on Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Pre-Trial Conference,
in Burningham's deposition in September, 1984, and at the first
day of the trial hereof.

In this regard, the trial court ruled

at the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment hearing that the amounts prayed for by Lloyd's
would be deemed accurate unless Nature's Way advised Lloyd's
prior to the trial of any offsets or adjustments to which
Nature's Way claimed it was entitled.

(R. 173-175)

This

ruling is consistent with the stipulation of the parties at the
hearing and Rule 2(g) and (h), Rules of Practice of the Third
Judicial District Court.

(Appendix "E")

At no time did

Nature's Way advise Lloyd's of the discrepancy in the commission rate schedule.

Lloyd's clearly relied upon the various

representations and stipulations of Nature's Way to its detriment and as such Nature's Way is estopped from asserting a new
claim for the first time on the second day of trial.

Under the

circumstances, the trial court should not have considered evidence that the applicable rate structure was other than that as
alleged by Lloyd's.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING LLOYD'S LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE AND
TO ASSERT A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORMATION
OF THE TYPEWRITTEN AGREEMENT•
As previously mentioned, the clear weight of the evidence and testimony before the Court entitles Lloyd's to reform
the typewritten agreement to conform to the evidence.
Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended
complaint herein to conform to the evidence adduced at the
trial hereof.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) provides in part:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform
to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment . . . .
It is axiomatic that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
should be liberally construed and applied so as to promote
justice.

Rule 1 provides that the rules "shall be liberally

construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."

This fundamental philosophy of

liberality which supports the rules is manifest in a number of
specific provisions including Rule 15(a) which specifically
provides that leave to amend shall be "freely" granted when
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"justice so requires."

This principle is also set forth in

Rule 54(c)(1), which provides for a kind of post-trial amendment by virtue of its requirement that "every final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings."

(Emphasis added.)

The philosophy that each case should be decided "on
its facts rather than on its pleadings," Keller v. Gerber, 114
Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 565 (1948), is so fundamental under
Utah law that amendments to pleadings have been allowed and
approved even after the trial court has filed its initial
memorandum decision.

See Watson v. Deseret Irrigation Co., 110

Utah 78, 69 P.2d 793 (1946).
As previously stated, defendant failed to raise any
issue as to the amounts payable under the rate schedule of the
contract until the second day of trail.

Prior to that time,

defendant and his counsel on numerous occasions before this
Court and during the course of Lynn Burninghamfs deposition,
stipulated and agreed that the commissions payable under the
Agreement, should it be determined to be valid, were to be
based upon 250, 350 and 50<£ and not .250, .350 and .500. This
fact is more particularly set forth in other areas of the argument herein and by this reference made a part hereof.

The

testimony offered at trial and stipulations made prior to and
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thereat, clearly support the relief for which plaintiff sought,
leave to amend its complaint for reformation of the subject
agreement.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
FIND A MUTUAL MISTAKE
HAD OCCURRED AND (B)
TO ACCURATELY REFLECT
UNDERSTANDING.

IN FAILING (A) TO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
TO REFORM THE CONTRACT
THE PARTIES' TRUE

This Court has long recognized that reformation of a
written instrument is appropriate if:
(1) ,the instrument as written fails to conform to
what both parties intended; or
(2)

that the claiming party was mistaken as to

its actual content and the other party knowing this
mistake kept silent; or
(3)

that the claiming party was mistaken as to

the actual content because of fraudulent, affirmative
behavior .i
Jensen v. Manila Corp, of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 65 (Utah 1977), citing 6 Powell on
Real Property § 903 (1977)
Lloyd's recognizes that to reform a written instrument
it must show a mutual mistake of the parties or a mistake on
the part of one and fraud or inequitable conduct such as
silence on the part of the other, as a result of which the
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instrument reflects something neither party had intended or
agreed to.

Bown v. Loveland, 670 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah 1984).

Lloyd's also recognizes that the mistake must be presented by
clear and convincing evidence.

Id.

In Bown, this Court

vacated the lower court's reformation primarily because the
issue of mutual mistake was not raised in the context of the
trial and the evidence failed to sustain that position.
The same test for reformation were recently cited by
this Court in Briggs v. Liddell, 669 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985).
In that case, this Court discussed the two general reasons that
a contract may be reformed:
First, if the instrument does not embody the
intentions of both parties to the contract,
a mutual mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. Second, if one party
is laboring under a mistake about a contract
term and that mistake either has been
induced by the other party or is known by and
conceded to by the other party, then the
inequitable nature of the other party's conduct will have the same operable effect as a
mistake, and reformation is permissible.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Lloyd's maintains that the commission rate of the
contract should have been reformed under both reasons.

First,

there is compelling evidence that the instrument does not
embody the intentions of both parties to the contract and that
a mutual mistake has occurred.

All pleadings, stipulations,

testimony of the parties and the differences between the
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handwritten and typewritten agreements compel the conclusion
that the commission schedule agreed upon by the party was as
plaintiff alleged and not as contained in the typewritten
agreement.

The only evidence contrary to this fact is the

testimony of Burningham on the trial's second day in which
Burningham believes that the commissions as agreed upon by the
parties were whatever was specified in the typewritten
contract.
In any event, the overwhelming weight of the evidence
satisfies the second theory of reformation.

As noted in

Briggs, supra, if one party (Lloyd's) is laboring under a
mistake about a contract term and the mistake is known by or
conceded to by the other party (Nature's Way), then the inequitable nature of Nature's Way's actions has the same operable
effect as a mistake.

659 P.2d at 772.

In this regard, it is

clear that Lloyd's was laboring under a mistake about the commission rate schedule.

Dowdle testified that any ambiguity or

error was a result of his mistaken belief that the handwritten
and typewritten agreements accurately reflected the parties'
intent and understanding that the per unit rates were 250, 350,
500 and $1.00.

(Tr. 633-634 and R. 293-306)

Assuming, arguendo, that Burningham did not have the
same mistaken belief as Dowdle, the inequitable nature of his
conduct in knowing and conceding to the commission schedule
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alleged by plaintiff must by law have the same operative effect
as a mistake.

This fact is readily apparent from the deposi-

tion testimony, summary judgment and pre-trial conference
hearing, trial stipulations, Order Governing Discovery, and
testimony of Burningham at the trial hereof, all of which were
relied upon by Dowdle.
The equitable doctrine of reformation applies where
there is no mistake about the terms of the agreement and the
only mistake is in connection with reducing the parties'
agreement to writing as is the case in the present action.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that reformation is most
appropriate in the circumstances.

A scrivener's inadvertent

error, or an error on the part of either party, no matter how
it occurred, may be corrected.
Trimming Co., 67 A.D. 2d

Baby Togs, Inc. v. Harold

868, 413 N.Y.2d 393, 394 (1979).

In the case of Simons v. Federal Bar Building Corp.,
275 A.2d 545 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), a written lease was executed
by the parties in which the scrivener committed a similar
to that committed by Dowdle in the present action.

error

In that

case, the figure of .015 was erroneously inserted in a contract
whereas the correct figure should have been 1.5.

In holding

that the parties should not be bound by the strict operation of
the contract the Court stated:
We believe this situation is governed by the
myriad of cases granting the relief for an
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obvious mistake in transposing the agreement
to writing.
275 A.2d at 551.
In that case, the D.C. Court of Appeals pointed out
that reformation has often been granted where the mistake has
been denominated "unilateral" and in cases where the courts
hold that the contract lacks mutuality even though the error
resulted from the miscalculation of only one party as was the
case in this action.

Lloyd's urges this Court to consider the

weight of the evidence to serve the purpose of the agreement as
was noted by the Simons court:
Fairness will best be served by weighing the
circumstances surrounding the mistake rather
than the application of mechanical rules
which ignore the real nature of the
situation.
275 A.2d at 551.
The fact that Dowdle prepared the handwritten and
typewritten agreements and made the mistake in their preparation should not bar Lloyd's from seeking or from obtaining the
reformation which it seeks.

This fact was noted in People v.

South East National Bank of Chicago, 266 N.E.2d 778, 781 (111.
App. Ct. 1971):
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that
not all negligence will be a bar to
rescission. If the mistake is natural in
the conduct of business, or is not the
result of culpable negligence or the neglect
of some positive legal duty, rescission will
be granted. Where the mistake is due to
-34-

clerical or arithmetic error the courts are
nearly unanimous in granting rescission or
other appropriate relief.
(Emphasis added)(citations omitted.)
In People, a subcontrator was relieved of his bid
because a decimal point was inadvertently misplaced by its
secretary.

In noting that this mistake was not due to the lack

of ordinary care and that the contractor should be given the
relief from the agreement as written, the Court stated:
To penalize Kelleher [subcontractor] for the
simple, honest mistake by enforcing the forfeiture provision of the contract would be
unjust.
Where the conditions requisite to relief
are present, equity will act in spite of a
contract to avoid the unconscionable result.
(Citations omitted.)
In that case, the Court noted that the standards
governing rescission were identical to that which has been
adopted in Utah, but held that when the mistake was due to a
clerical error, such as a misplaced decimal point as in the
present case, the party making the error was entitled to
appropriate relief.
This court has recognized the equitable standards set
forth in People, and Simons, supra.

In Hottinger v. Jensen,

684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984), this Court held that reformation is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument
are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent and
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clerical or arithmetic error the courts are
nearly unanimous in granting rescission or
other appropriate relief,
(Emphasis added)(citations omitted.)
In People, a subcontrator was relieved of his bid
because a decimal point was inadvertently misplaced by its
secretary.

In noting that this mistake was not due to the lack

of ordinary care and that the contractor should be given the
relief from the agreement as written, the Court stated:
To penalize Kelleher [subcontractor] for the
simple, honest mistake by enforcing the forfeiture provision of the contract would be
unjust.
Where the conditions requisite to relief
are present, equity will act in spite of a
contract to avoid the unconscionable result.
(Citations omitted.)
In that case, the Court noted that the standards
governing rescission were identical to that which has been
adopted in Utah, but held that when the mistake was due to a
clerical error, such as a misplaced decimal point as in the
present case, the party making the error was entitled to
appropriate reliefL
This court has recognized the equitable standards set
forth in People, and Simons, supra.

In Hottinger v. Jensen,

684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984), this Court held that reformation is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument
are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent and
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understanding of the parties.

See also Friedman v. Development

Management Group, Inc., 82 111. App. 3d 949, 43 N.E.2d 610, 612
(1980).

In Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980), the

Court approved the reformation of a real estate contract and
explained that if the difference in the two agreements in that
case was due to fraud or mistake then the agreement could be
reformed.
The same principles are also present in the early case
Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571 (1950).

In

Sine, this Court approved the reformation of a deed by the lower
court and found that the evidence justified the finding of
mutual mistake of fact.

The Court also noted that "any other

finding would have rendered an absurd result, absurd in the
sense that the reason for the contract known to both parties
would have been utterly ignored."

222 P.2d at 584.

This Court

also noted that the clear and convincing standard for reformation does not require that the evidence be undisputed in all
details.

The Court stated:
The test of clear and convincing is whether,
taking the evidence as a whole, it preponderates to a convincing degree in favor of
[the party seeking reformation].

Id.
The lower court found in this case that the intent of
the parties did not change between the execution of the
handwritten agreement and the execution of the typewritten
-36-

agreement.

As such, it impliedly held that there had been a

mutual mistake of fact and that the typewritten agreement did
not accurately reflect the parties true understanding and that
there was a clerical error in preparing both documents.
Lloyd's recognizes that its heavy burden is to
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial courtfs
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
to support the findings.

As previously stated, the findings of

the trial court are inherently inconsistent and the clear
weight of all the evidence and record before this Court
establishes that it was the intent of the parties that commissions be paid upon the schedule as alleged in plaintiff's
Complaint and throughout this proceeding.

This is the only

schedule that is consistent with the $500.00 commission paid by
Nature's Way to Lloyd's prior to the execution of the typewritten agreement for the initial three month sales of its product
to Yurika.

Any other finding would render an absurd result

completely inconsistent with the clear weight of the evidence.
Point V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
HANDWRITTEN AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY THE
PARTIES CONTAINED A COMMISSION RATE
STRUCTURE AT THE RATE OF .350 RATHER THAN
THE RATE OF 350.
Lloyd's suggest that a close review of the commission
rate schedule of Exhibit 2 clearly reveals that there is no
-37-

decimal point before the 350 and urged that interpretation upon
the trial court.

The trial court, however, found that a deci-

mal point did exist.

Lloydfs submits this finding was improper

and contrary to the document itself.

An interpretation that

the handwritten agreement contains commissions at the rate of
350, 500 and $1.00 is consistent with the compelling weight of
the evidence at the trial hereof and adds further support to
the fact that the typewritten agreement did not accurately
reflect the parties1 true understanding.
Point VI
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF ITS COSTS OF
DEPOSITIONS AND SERVICE OF SUBPOENA UPON
NATURE'S WAY'S PRESIDENT FOR HIS DEPOSITION.
After the lower court ruled on the case, plaintiff
filed its Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 54.

(R. 371-373)

Included in its claim for

costs, plaintiff sought the recovery for the service of a subpoena upon Burningham, the president of Nature's Way, and for
the depositions of Burningham and Webb.

Nature's Way objected

to these costs and filed a motion to have the bill of costs
taxed by the Court.

(R. 325-328)

On June 11, 1985, the lower

court ruled on the issue of costs and denied Lloyd's right of
recovery for the costs of depositions and service of subpoena.
(R.

649-656)
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Lloyd's submits that the Court abused its discretion
in not awarding it these expenses.

Under established law, the

determination of whether to award the expenses of a deposition
as costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567
(Utah 1974).

In making that determination, the courts apply a

two tier approach.

First, whether the deposition was used at

trial, and secondly whether the deposition was necessary for
the preparation of the prevailing party's case.

The law was

recently summarized as follows:
[T]he majority of this Court has consistently held that the costs of depositions
are taxable "subject to the limitation that
the trial court is persuaded that they were
taken in good faith and, in the light of the
circumstances, appeared to be essential for
the development and presentation of the
case."
Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 683
P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984), quoting Frarapton v. Wilson, 605
P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980).
Upon consideration of the factors outlined above, it
is clear that the costs claimed by the plaintiff are proper.
The defendant cannot claim that the depositions of its principal, Lynn Burninghara, and Douglas Webb were not taken in good
faith.

Likewise, all the depositions were essential for the

development and presentation of the case.

Furthermore, the

deposition of Mr. Burninghara was used at trial in cross-39-

examining Mr. Burningham, and portions were read into the
record.

(Tr. 512)

The expenses of the deposition should be

awarded as costs where the deposition was used by the party
during the course of the trial.

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d

601, 604 (Utah 1978).
The deposition of Mr. Webb was taken at a time when
both parties anticipated that he would be unavailable to
testify at trial.

In view of the circumstances existing at the

time, the taking of the deposition was necessary for the development and presentation of plaintiff's case.

The expenses of

the deposition therefore come clearly within the rules set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Lawson Supply Co. v. General
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607, 609
(1972):
A test, which has been applied in determining the propriety of allowing as costs to
the prevailing party the expense of a deposition taken by him, is whether the deposition was necessarily obtained in the sense
that the taking of the deposition and its
general content were reasonably necessary
for the development of the case in the light
of the situation then existing.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the depositions of both Burningham and Webb were taken in good faith, and
were necessary to the development and presentation of the case,
and should therefore be allowed as costs.
The Court's denial of the service of subpoena on

-40-

Burningham to insure that he appeared at his deposition is
equally unsupportable.

As cited in the section entitled

"Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court,"
defendant was served a summons and complaint in September,
1983. (R. 5-7)

From October through April, 1984, Nature's Way

failed to file any responsive pleading to the complaint and was
represented by two separate attorneys in an effort to discuss
settlement.

(R. 53-61)

In early November, 1983, Lloyd's

served upon counsel for Nature's Way, interrogatories and documents requests in an effort to obtain some sort of accounting
from Nature's Way to adequately discuss and explore the possibility of settlement.

(Id. a'hd 8-16)

For approximately six months, Lloyd's attempted to
obtain information from Nature's Way pursuant to the request,
but no such information was provided.

In April, 1984, Lloyd's

was forced to file a motion to compel discovery and for other
appropriate sanctions.

(R. 17-33)

After Lloyd's had set the

matter for hearing, Nature's Way counsel withdrew.

(R. 25-26)

Plaintiff thereafer obtained an order directing
Nature's Way to appoint new counsel to represent it at the
hearing.

(R. 27-29)

Defendant failed to appear at the hearing

and the Court ordered that the outstanding discovery be
completed by it on or before June 1, 1984.

(R. 35-37)

On the

very day that the discovery was due, Nature's Way retained pre-
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sent counsel who obtained a two week extension to respond to
discovery.

(R. 38, 45-47)

Because of Lloyd's past dealings with Nature's Way and
its president, Burningham, Lloyd's felt compelled to serve
Burningham with a subpoena duces tecum to insure his presence
at the deposition and request that he produce certain documents.

Burningham was not an actual party to the proceeding

and in view of Lloyd's past dealings with him the service of
the subpoena was necessary.
CONCLUSION
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial courts, there is insufficient evidence to support the
trial court's findings and the findings are inconsistent.

The

Court erred in failing to find a mutual mistake had occurred
and in denying plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint
seeking reformation of the contract.

The trial court erred in

finding that the handwritten agreement contained a decimal
before the 350.

Finally, the trial court abused its discretion

in not awarding plaintiff its costs of depositions and service
of subpoena upon an agent of Nature's Way.
For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff requests this
Court to modify the findings to conform to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence, allow plaintiff to file an amended
complaint, and enter a judgment against Nature's Way consistent
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with the commission rate schedule as alleged by plaintiff in
the amount of $39,710.41 as of February 28, 1985.

In the

alternative, Lloyd's requests the court to vacate the judgment
and remand the case for a new trial or, at the very least, for
a trial on the issue of mutual mistake and reformation.

In

view of the fact that until the second day of the trial hereof
all parties viewed the parties' agreement to be governed by the
commission rate schedule alleged by plaintiff and plaintiff
relief upon the representations and stipulations of Nature's
Way, to that effect a trial with respect to the issue of
whether a mistake occurred sufficient to justify reformation
should be held.
DATED this

) ?

day of March, 1986.

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant, Appeal from the Judgment of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Honorable Dean E. Conder were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following named individual at the address listed below this
]o

day of March, 1986:
Terry M. Crellin, Esq.
M. Wayne Western
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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APPENDIX "A"

RAY G. MARTINEAU (USB #2105)
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872)
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a
corporation,
Pla|intiff ,

)
)

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs .

)
)
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD., )

a corporation,
Defendant.

)

Civil No. C83-6058

)

(Judge Dean E. Conder)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
without a jury before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the
above-entitled Court on February 25 and 26, 1985, plaintiff
being present through its president, Lloyd R. Dowdle, and
represented by its counsel, Ray G. Martineau and Kevin J.
Sutterfield, and defendant being present through its president,
Lynn R. Burningham, and represented by its counsel, Terry M.
Crellin, and the Court having heard the testimony presented at
the trial hereof, and having received and reviewed the exhibits
submitted by the parties, having requested the parties to sub-1-

mit post trial memoranda and having reviewed the same, and
having previously entered its minute entries dated March 19,
1985 and April 8, 1985, having heard argument of counsel with
respect to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
on June 11, 1985, and being fully advised in the premises now
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

During the spring of 1982, plaintiff's president,

Lloyd R. Dowdle (ffDowdle!f) and defendant's president, Lynn
Burningham ("Burningham") entered into an oral understanding in
which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff commissions on all
sales made by defendant to Yurika Foods Corporation ("Yurika")
in consideration of plaintiff's efforts in acquiring Yurika to
market a coffee extender product handled by defendant.
2.

On or about April 24, 1982, defendant entered into

an agreement with Yurika whereby Yurika became the exclusive
sales and marketing representative for defendant for the coffee
extender product.
3.

On or about August 11, 1982, after previous oral

negotiations between Dowdle and Burningham, a hand written
agreement prepared by Dowdle was presented to Burningham.

A

discussion followed wherein the parties modified the handwritten agreement, and the modified handwritten agreement was then
-2-

signed by both parties.
4.

The handwritten agreement actually executed by

Dowdle and Burningham on August 11, 1982, contained the
following provisions with respect to the commission schedule:
1 Unit - 60 packets pack:

.25^

1 Unit - 2 lb. bulk pack:

.35^

1 Unit - 5 lb. bulk pack:

50£

1 Unit - 37 lb. bulk pack:
5.

$1.00

Dowdle thereafter caused the executed hand written

agreement to be typed by his secretary and the commission schedule contained in Paragraph 1 thereof was typed as follows:
1 Unit - 60 packet pack:

.25$^

1 Unit - 2 lb. bulk pack:

.35^

1 Unit - 5 lb. bulk pack:

. 50£

1 Unit - 37 lb. bulk pack:

$1.00

The typewritten agreement was executed by the parties on August
16, 1982.
6.

The intent of the parties with respect to the com-

missions to be paid by defendant to plaintiff did not change
between August 11, 1982, the date of the execution of the hand
written agreement and August 16, 1982, the date of execution of
the typewritten agreement.
7.

Paragraph 5 of the typewritten agreement contains

an integration clause which states that the "Agreement con-
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tains the entire understanding of the parties hereto and may
not be altered, amended, modified, or discharged in any way
whatsoever except by subsequent agreement in writing by all the
parties hereto.tf

The Agreement was to be effective between the

parties as of August 1, 1982.
8.

On August 16, 1982, defendant paid to plaintiff

the amount of $500.00 as and for commissions due plaintiff for
previous sales made of the coffee saver product to Yurika by
defendant from April 24, 1982 through August 1, 1982.

This

payment was made without a formal accounting being made as to
the actual number of sales of the subject product from defendant to Yurika.
9.

The number of units of the coffee saver product

expressly covered by the agreement of the parties which were
sold to Yurika by defendant between August 1, 1982 and February
23, 1984 ("Subject Period") was stipulated by the plaintiff and
defendant as follows:
60 packets pack:

77,348 units

2 lb. pack:

16,217 units

5 lb. bulk pack:

4,564 units

37 lb. bulk pack:
10.

0 units

At the time the handwritten and typewritten

agreements were executed, the parties assumed that all of the
coffee saver product sold by defendant to Yurika would be
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marketed in units consisting of 60 packets packs, 2 lb. bulk
packs, 5 lb. bulk packs and 37 lb. bulk packs.

The reasonable

intent and expectation of the parties was that in the event the
coffee saver product was sold to Yurika and marketed by it in
any other size of units, plaintiff would receive a commission
from defendant on the basis of their size and weight compared
to the rates of their agreement.
11.

Supplemental sales of coffee saver product were

made to Yurika by defendant during the Subject Period in 30 lb.
bulk pack units and 30 packets pack units.

The supplemental

sales were closely related to the units of product recited in
the typewritten agreement.

Specifically, a 30 packets pack

unit is exactly one-half of a 60 packets pack unit and the 30
lb. bulk pack unit is almost equal to the 37 lb. bulk pack
unit.
12.

The number of units of supplemental sales were

stipulated by the plaintiff and defendant to be as follows:
30 packets pack:

51,444 units

30 lb. bulk pack:
13.

18 units

Defendant received in excess of $625,000.00 from

Yurika for sales of the coffee extender product to Yurika
during the Subject Period.
14.

Dowdle agreed orally with Burningham to pay

Burningham one-half of anything Dowdle would receive from
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Yurika in the way of a finder's fee for putting Yurika in contact with Burningham.
15.

There is insufficient evidence to indicate that

Dowdle received an actual finder's fee, and as to any value any
such finder's fee may have.
16.

Defendant failed to pay to plaintiff any com-

missions or provide any accounting to plaintiff pursuant to the
terms of their agreement prior to the time that the aboveentitled action was filed.
17.

The agreement contained no provision for the

award of attorney's fees in favor of the prevailing party.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now
makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The typewritten agreement is a valid, integrated

and enforceable contract binding on both parties and defendant
is liable for commissions in accordance with the explicit terms
of the typewritten agreement.
2.

The size and weight of supplemental sales of the

coffee extender product made by defendant to Yurika bear a
nexus to the product size and weights set forth in the
typewritten agreement and defendant should be liable for commissions on (1) all sales of 30 packets pack units in an amount
of one-half the commission on 60 packets pack units and
-6-

(2)

all sales of 30 lb. pack units in an amount of the commission
on a 37 lb.
3.

bulk pack.
Plaintiff shouLd be awarded judgment against

defendant for commissions due plaintiff pursuant to the express
terms of the typewritten agreement from the period between
August 1, 1982 and February 23, 1984 in an amount of $272.48
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum thereon in an amount of $49.16, for a total of $321.64,
and plaintiff should be awarded judgment against defendant for
commissions due for the supplemental sales made by defendant to
Yurika during the Subject Period in an amount of $80.31
together with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum thereon in an amount of $12.30, for a total of $94.61,
making a present total judgment of $416.25, together with
interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from the date hereof until paid.
4.

Plaintiff should be further awarded court costs

against defendant but no attorney's fees.
5.

Defendant should take nothing on its counterclaim.
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MADE AND ENTERED this

day of June, 1985

BY THE COURT:
\

J.-

^ <-/

Judge*Dean E. Conder

Certificate of Service
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following on
this

\3^

da

Y

of

June, 1985:
Terry M. Crellin
M. Wayne Western
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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APPENDIX "B"
Terry M. Crellin (USB #0755)
M. Wayne Western (USB #3433)
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84 070
Telephone: 566-6633
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,

>
1
•

LIST OF WITNESSES
AND EXHIBITS WHICH
DEFENDANT MAY USE

>
i

Civil No. C83-6058
(Judge Dean E. Conder)

vs.
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation,
Defendant.
In accordance with the instructions of the* Court, the
following List of Witnesses and Exhibits is being provided,

WITNESSES

1.

2.

RPE. N0ftTH
WESTERN
JTW STATE STREET
Y. UTAH 64070
)1) 566-6633

Lynn Burningham

will testify about negotiations
with Yurika and negotiations with
plaintiff including consideration
for the agreement. Mr. Lynn
Burningham will also testify as t
the subject matter of the
Counterlaim.

Todd Burningham

will testify about negotiations
with plaintiff including
consideration given for the
agreement. Mr. Todd Burningham
will also testify as to the
subject matter of the
Counterclaim.

Jack Patterson

will testify as to attending
meetings held by plaintiff and th<
occurrences at those meetings.

Max Hymas

will testify as to the
circumstances and expectations of
defendant concerning the
negotiations and agreement betwee
plaintiff and defendant.

Ronald Cutler

will testify as an expert
concerning the amount of material
shipped and delivered to Yurika
and the amount of income plaintii
derived form the executive
distributorship which was receive
from Yurika.

6.

Marian Webb

will testify about her son's and
Mr. Dawdle's association and the:
mutual association with Yurika ar
Universe Foods.

7.

Lloyd R. Dcwdle

will be asked questions concernir
the entire subject matter of the
suit, including the Counterclaim

4.

EXHIBITS
1.

Hand written page showing Dowdle's expenses with

respect to Yurika activities.
2.

Distributor Application of Dowdle for Yurika.

3.

Distributor Application of Dowdle for Universe Food

4.

Yurika Foods Corp. Bonus Recap and Monthly

Transaction Reports for months of April 1982 through October
1984.
5.

Product Purchase Orders for orders by plaintiff fro

Yurika.
6.

Article excerpt from May 1982 issue of Utah Holiday

Magazine.
6a. Sales Manual Rules & Regulations Brochure of Yurika

THORPE. NORTH
& WESTERN
.. " i . . - r * * t S'R£ET

7.

Agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated

August 6, 1982.
8.

Check No. 720 from defendnt to plaintiff.

9.

Nondisclosure Statement between defendant and YuriNovember 1983

,!

Bn.

10.

Stargazer —

11.

Stargazer -- December 1983.

12.

Agreement between defendant and Yurika dated April

24, 1982.
The exhibits listed as Nos. 1-7 and 10 and 11 were
obtained from plaintiff, and there is no need to provide copi
to plaintiff.

A copy of Exhibit No. 8 is being provided

plaintiff herewith.

Copies of Exhibit Nos. 9 and 12 have

previously been provided to plaintiff.
Dated this 25th day of January 1985.

^ / .

Terry M£/Crellin
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing LIST
OF WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS WHICH DEFENDANT MAY USE was hand
delivered to the law offices of Ray G. Martineau, 1800
Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on this 25th day of January, 1985.

RPE, NORTH
WESTERN
(TH S'ATE STREET
Y, UTAH &4070
)1) 566-6633
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APPENDIX "C

KEVIN J. SUTTSRFIELD (USB #38/2)
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (USB #3752)
LAW OFFICES OF RAY G. MARTINEAU, P.C.
1800 3enefieial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a
corporation,

PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF
PROCEEDINGS OF UNREPORTED
HEARING

Plaintiff,

0

P

vs.

Civil No. C83-6058

NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation,
Defendant,

(Judge Dean E. Conder)

Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(g), Plaintiff submits
the following statement as to the proceedings of the hearing
held before the above-entitled Court on January 22, 1985.

The

grounds for the statement is that no transcript of the proceedings was made by the Court Reporter.
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

At the hearing on January 22,

1985, the Court con-

sidered two matters, plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on file herein dated January 4, 1985, and a Pre-trial
-1-

Settlement Conference pursuant to Court Order dated November
26, 1984 on file herein.
2.

At the hearing, defendant, through its counsel,

stipulated that there was no issue with respect to the amounts,
if any, due and owing by it to plaintiff as sought in
Plaintiff f s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on file herein
dated January 4, 1985, pursuant to that certain Agreement between plaintiff and defendant dated August 16, 1982.
Defendant's only opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was that defendant claimed" t*he Agreement was
unenforceable because there was no indication in the Agreement
that any actual consideration for the contract was given by
plaintiff.

There was no dispute at the hearing as to the

amounts prayed for by plaintiff or as to the commissions to be
paid by defendant for sales defendant made to a third party.
The fact that defendant did not object to the amounts prayed
for by plaintiff in the event that the Agreement was enforceable is evident from Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated January
16, 1985, and its Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated January
23, 1985, both on file herein.

Plaintiff's counsel, who

attended the hearing, also has a specific recollection that
defendant, through its counsel, admitted that there was no
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dispute as to the amounts owing under the Agreement, if the
Agreement was found to be enforceable.
3.

At the hearing, the Court also instructed counsel

for each party to furnish to opposing counsel on or before
January 25, 1985, a list of witnesses and exhibits to be relied
upon in the trial of this matter.

The Court also ruled that

all objections to said witnesses and exhibits should be filed
and served on opposing counsel on or before January 28, 1985.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the amounts prayed for in
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be deemed
accurate unless defendant advises plaintiff prior to the trial
hereof of any facts, documents, or information upon which
defendant intended to rely with respect to any offsets or
adjustments in said amount as prayed for by plaintiff.
Plaintiff's counsel has a specific recollection of this ruling
and the ruling is set forth in that certain Order Governing
Discovery on file herein mailed to opposing counsel on January
29, 1985.

No objection to the Order Governing Discovery was

filed by defendant and the fact that the parties relied upon
the Court's ruling is also indicated by the List of Witnesses
and Exhibits submitted by plaintiff and the List of Witnesses
and Exhibits Which Defendant May Use dated January 25, 1985 on
file herein.
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DATED this

15

day of March, 1986,

]

/

iiW\As<mit^.

^ >

KEVIN J^ "SUTTERFuELD "
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This will certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Plaintiff's Statement of Proceedings of Unreported
Hearing was served upon the following, by mailing a copy
thereof, postage prepaid, to the address listed below this
i^av

of March, 1986:
Terry M. Crellin, Esq.
M. Wayne Western
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

y^fac^w lA-&*
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APPENDIX MD

RAY G. MARTINEAU (USB #2105)
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD (USB #3872)
1800 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2400
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD'S UNLIMITED, a
corporation,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
NATURE'S WAY MARKETING, LTD.,
a corporation,

Civil No. C83-6058
(Judge Dean E. Conder)

Defendant.

Plaintiff complains of defendant and for causes of
action alleges:
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized,

validly existing and in good standing under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Utah and has its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant is a corporation duly organized and

existing under the laws of the State of Utah and has its prin-1-

cipal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

The venue of this action is properly laid in

the above-entitled Court, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended and
supplemented•
COUNT I
(Contract Reformation)
4.

The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through

3 above are by this reference incorporated into and made a part
of this Count I.
5.

On or prior 1 to August 1, 1982 plaintiff and defen-

dant entered into a certain agreement (,fAgreement11) for the
distribution, sales and marketing of a certain coffee extender
product to be marketed under the names "Spring Water Mineral
Brew11 and "Golden Cup Coffee Saver" ("Spring Water/Golden
Cup").
6.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant

agreed and became obligated to pay to plaintiff a monthly commission, due and payable each month on or before twenty days
following the end of the month, to which such payment related,
on the net sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup computed on the
following basis:
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Commission Due Lloyd's
Unlimited per Unit

Quantity Sold
1 unit - 60 packets pack

$

.25

1 unit -

21b. bulk pack

.35

1 unit -

51b. bulk pack

.50

1 unit - 371b. bulk pack

1.00

7.

The Agreement between plaintiff and defendant was

reduced to a handwritten instrument on or about August 11,
1982 and to a subsequent typewritten Agreement dated on or
about August 16, 1982 wherein the commissions due Lloyd's
Unlimited per unit as agreed to by the parties was ambiguously
or inaccurately reflected therein.

Copies of said handwritten

and typewritten instruments are attached hereto marked Exhibits
"A" and

ff

B" and by reference made a part hereof.
8.

At the time the typewritten Agreement was exe-

cuted by the parties, plaintiff and defendant had agreed and
fully intended that Paragraph 1(a) thereof would read as
follows:
1 unit - 60 packets pack

$

.25

1 unit - 2 lb. bulk pack

.35

1 unit - 5 lb. bulk pack

.50

1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack

1.00

9.

By reason of said ambiguity or scrivener error,

plaintiff is entitled to have the Agreement between the parties
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reformed by the Court to accurately reflect the parties 1
agreement, intent and understanding as stated above.
COUNT II
(Claims for Commissions Owing)
10.

The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through

9 above are by this reference incorporated into and made a part
of this Count II.
11.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant

agreed and became obligated to pay to plaintiff a monthly commission, due and payable each month on or before twenty days
following the end of the month to which such payment related,
on the net sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup computed on the
following basis:
Commission Due Lloyd's
Unlimited per Unit

Quantity Sold
1 unit - 60 packets pack

$

.25

1 unit -

2 lb. bulk pack

.35

1 unit -

5 lb. bulk pack

.50

1 unit - 37 lb. bulk pack

1.00

12.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant

agreed and became obligated to deliver to plaintiff an
accounting for all Spring Water/Golden Cup sales, which
accounting was to accompany any commission payment due plaintiff as above stated.
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13.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement defendant

agreed and became obligated to make available for plaintiff's
inspection and/or copying, at all reasonable times, any and all
accounting records and all documents pertaining to defendant's
sales of Spring Water/Golden Cup.
14.

Plaintiff has made repeated demands upon defen-

dant for payment of commissions due plaintiff on defendant's
distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup products, but despite
said demands defendant has wholly failed, neglected and refused
to pay the same or any part thereof, and said commissions for
the period commencing August 1, 1982, through the date hereof
are still due and owing to plaintiff, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when the
same became due until paid.
15.

Plaintiff has made repeated demands upon defen-

dant for an accounting of sales that have been made and of commissions due, copies of defendant's monthly accounting records
relating to the same and any and all other related documents
indicating the distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup for the
period commencing August 1, 1982 through the date hereof, but
despite said demands defendant has wholly failed, neglected and
refused to deliver any accounting or related documents to plaintiff or to make any of such documents available for plaintiff's
inspection and copying, except pursuant to discovery herein.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1.

Under Count I hereof for an Order of this Court

reforming the typewritten executed Agreement to accurately
reflect the parties1 agreement, intent and understanding.
2.

Under Count II hereof, for an Order requiring

defendant to provide plaintiff with a proper accounting of
defendant's sales and distribution of Spring Water/Golden Cup
for the period commencing August 1, 1982 through the date
hereof.
3.

Under Count II hereof for a judgment in favor of

plaintiff and against defendant for any and all sums found to
be due and owing by defendant to plaintiff under and in connection with said Agreement, together with damages resulting from
the breach by defendant of said Agreement.
4.

For plaintiff's costs incurred herein.

5.

For such other and further relief as may appear

just and equitable in the premises.

RAY G. MART1NEAU
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Certificate of Service
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Amended Complaint to the following on this
1985:
Terry M. Crellin
M. Wayne Western
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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day of March,

APPENDIX " E "
Rule 2

RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Rule

Rule 2. Law and Motion Calendar.
Rules 2.7 and 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circi
Courts of the State of U t a h shall not apply to motions filed in the Third Judic
District Court.
(a) All law and motion m a t t e r s will be heard by the judge assigned
the case. These m a t t e r s will be set on a regular law and motion calend
as arranged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the case. Ex pai
m a t t e r s based upon stipulation will be presented only to the jud
assigned to the case.
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a date for hearing on t]
regular law and motion calendar, or may file a written request t h a t tl
m a t t e r be resolved without hearing based upon the briefs submitted.
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring written notice wi
be heard only after written notice, which shall be served not less t h a n fn
(5) days prior to the date specified in the notice for hearing, unless tl
court for good cause shown shall by order shorten t h e time for notice
hearing.
(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not t
heard unless the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at leai
forty-eight (48) hours before the hearing on the said motion.
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by the U t a h Rules <
Civil Procedure shall not be received, except on stipulation of the partie
or for good cause shown.
(f) All motions except uncontested or ex parte m a t t e r s may b
accompanied by a brief statement of points and authorities, and any affidE
vits relied upon in support thereof. Points and authorities supporting o
opposing a motion shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, exclusive of th
s t a t e m e n t of material facts as hereinafter provided, except as waived b;
order of the court on ex parte application.
(g) The points and authorities in support of a dispositive motion shal
begin with a section t h a t contains a concise s t a t e m e n t of material facts a
to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall b<
stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity
to those portions of the record upon which the movant relies.
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a dispositive motion shal
begin with a section t h a t contains a concise s t a t e m e n t of material facts as
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon which the opposing part}
relies and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences oi
t h e movant's facts t h a t are disputed. All material facts set forth in the
s t a t e m e n t of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose oi
s u m m a r y judgment, unless specifically controverted by the statement oi
t h e opposing party.
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RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Rule 3

(i) If a m e m o r a n d u m of points and authorities is filed in support of a
notion it m u s t be served on the opposing party or his counsel and filed
with the court no later t h a n ten (10) days before the date set for hearing,
[fa reply m e m o r a n d u m is filed it shall be served upon the opposing party
Dr counsel no later t h a n five (5) days before the date of hearing.
(j) A courtesy copy of all affidavits and memoranda of points and
authorities filed by counsel shall be served upon the judge hearing the
matter at least forty-eight (48) hours before the date set for hearing, and
shall indicate the date upon which the m a t t e r is set for hearing. Such copy
shall be clearly m a r k e d as a courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the
clerk of the court.
(k) The court in civil matters on its motion or at a party's request may
direct a r g u m e n t of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all such telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by any counsel.

le 3. Limitation on Discovery and Motions*
) The parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the U t a h
»s of Civil Procedure shall not file Interrogatories or Requests with the
t, but shall file only a certificate of service stating t h a t such
rrogatories or Requests have been served on the other parties and the date
ich service.
re party serving the Interrogatories or Requests shall retain the original
eof with the original proof of service affixed to it. The party responding to
Interrogatories or Requests shall serve original responses made under oath
:h shall be retained by the party serving the Interrogatories or Requests,
written Interrogatories or Requests and any responses thereto shall not be
[ unless the court on motion and notice and for good cause shown so orders.
) Any party filing a Motion to Compel compliance with any discovery shall
ch a copy of the Interrogatories, Requests or Answers at issue in such
ion.
) All parties shall be entitled as a m a t t e r of right to conduct discovery
:eedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be
pleted and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later
i thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The right to
luct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial shall be
lin the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty
days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon
ce to the other parties in the action. In exercising its discretion the court
11 take into consideration the necessity and reasons for such discovery, the
^ence or lack of diligence of the parties seeking such discovery, whether the
n i t t i n g of such discovery will prevent the case from going to trial on the
2 set, or result in prejudice to any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or
it voluntary exchange of information or discovery by stipulation of the
ties at any time prior to the date set for trial, but in no event shall such
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